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Abstract: More advanced technologies demand higher degrees of specialization – and 
longer chains of production connecting raw inputs to final outputs. Longer production 
chains are subject to a “weakest link” effect: they are more fragile and more prone to 
failure. Optimal chain length is determined by the trade-off between the gains to 
specialization and the higher failure rate associated with longer chain length. There is a 
kind of reverse “Keynesian multiplier” that magnifies the effect of real shocks. 
Consequently, more advanced economies should have higher unemployment rates and be 
more prone to crisis. The implications of the theory both for measurement and 
government policy are examined.  
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1. Introduction 
  Since Adam Smith there has been little doubt that the wealth of nations is driven 
by the degree of specialization. The amount of specialization in a modern economy is 
remarkable – Seabright’s [2004] description of the number of ingredients and countries 
involved in the production of an item so humble as a shirt is a beautiful illustration of this 
point. It is illustrated as well by the number of parts in a modern good: according to 
Boeing, for example, there are over 6,000,000 parts in a 747. 
  Specialization in turn implies many stages of production, an aspect of the 
production function not present in most economic models. The goal of this paper is to 
give a simple account of how the number of stages of production are determined – the 
determinants of the degree of specialization –  and the implications for growth and 
development. 
  The key motivating idea is that long “chains” of production are vulnerable to 
failure of a single link. Hence while long chains permit a high degree of specialization 
and so a large quantity of output, they are also more prone to failure. Consequently, 
production chains form a natural basis for an economy in which there are low risk low 
reward projects and high risk high reward projects, a common notion in the study of 
financial market imperfections. 
  This idea that failure of a single link may cause a “cascade” of failures is not a 
new one. It is implicit in the idea of a Keynesian multiplier – employing or unemploying 
a single person reverberates through the economy much as the unemployment of a single 
person in a production chain unravels the entire chain. Similarly, Leijonhufvud’s [1976] 
notion of the vulnerability of long chains of credit to a single bankruptcy has a flavor 
similar to the disruption of a long chain of production by the failure of a single producer. 
Moreover the spirit of the model here is similar to that of Becker and Murphy [1992] who 
also argue that the degree of specialization is limited to a large extent by the problem that 
long chains of production are more inclined to failure. 
The notion of stages of production is not new either. In industrial organization 
short production chains have been studied in the context of vertical versus horizontal 
integration, such as, for example, in Grossman and Hart [1986], but the issue of chain 
fragility is not addressed. A part of the macroeconomics literature has studied economies   2 
made up of a single broad production chain.  Such models have been used in international 
trade, for example by Dixit and Grossman [1982] and to study how the pricing 
consequences of monetary policy feed down the supply chain, for example by Huang and 
Liu [2001].  
More relevant is the multi-sectoral work of Horvath [1998, 2000] who shows how 
independent shocks across sectors can be magnified by linkages across sectors. However, 
unlike the model here where there are many narrow parallel chains, the issue of fragility 
does not arise with a single broad chain. Horvath’s work has been recently generalized by 
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi [2010] who examine many interacting sectors, 
addressing the question of when shocks spread across many sectors tend to average out as 
opposed to creating aggregate fluctuations. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg [2008] appear 
to have long chains of fixed length in their study of off-shoring. Their production 
technology is difficult to infer from their paper, and their focus in any case is on the 
location of chains links, not the fragility of chains. 
The issue of fragility is the key idea in Kremer’s [1993] o-ring theory of 
development, but he focuses on assortive matching of workers in the presence of 
complementaries.  Recently, no doubt inspired by the current crisis, there has been a 
resurgence of interest in the fragility of chains. Jones [2010] studies a broad intermediate 
goods sector producing many different kinds of inputs all used in intermediate goods 
production with a one-period lag. The distribution of productivity across sectors and the 
level of complementarities determine the multiplier effect of resource misallocation 
across sectors. It acts much like the parameter determining the correlation of shocks 
across chains does in this model. Two recent papers build on this work by adopting a 
network perspective. Carvalho [2010] advances Jones work by using data on direct inputs 
rather than just the input output table data. Oberfield [2011]  traces the dynamics of 
shocks across sectors. In a sense the model in this paper simplifies matters by adopting a 
Leontief specification for technology. The advantage is that this makes it possible to 
address the depth of chains and the determination of the degree of specialization as well 
as the role of capital market imperfections.  
In a sense the central question addressed by this paper is “Are capitalist 
economies prone to crises?” There is a long history of conjecture that this might be the 
case, running from Marx to Keynes. What the alternative to a “capitalist economy” is and   3 
whether this is an empirical fact have not to my knowledge been resolved. However, the 
notion of production chains leads to a more specific and testable conjecture – capitalist 
economies by virtue of being efficient employ longer and more specialized production 
chains than more poorly organized economies. This raises output, welfare and utility, but 
it also leads to more “crises” than shorter less efficient production chains in the sense that 
output is more volatile. One might summarize by saying: capitalist economies are more 
subject to crises than less efficient economies – and this is a good thing. 
The model has several related implications. First, suppose the measure of the size 
of a real shock is the number of links that fail. The consequence of such a shock depends 
heavily on how the failures are distributed. If they are concentrated in particular chains, 
the resulting unemployment and output loss is small. If they are spread across many 
chains, the resulting unemployment and output loss is large. So the model is consistent 
with the idea that a small real shock may have either large or small consequences – the 
magnitude of a shock is not properly measured by the number of links that fail, but rather 
by the number of chains that fail. 
We are also interested in the role of financial markets. We model a simple 
financial market imperfection where insurance is limited by repayment constraints as in 
Kehoe and Levine [1993]. Better insurance markets mean that the second best will have 
longer chains, and higher output and welfare. We examine also the role of government 
policy.  
2. The Technology 
There is an infinite sequence of different intermediate goods  1, 2, j   and one 
final good 0. There is a continuum of individuals. Each individual is endowed with one 
unit of labor. Anyone can use x  units of labor to produce  x b  units of any type of 
intermediate good or the final good. 
Anybody can choose to be a specialist of any type. A specialist of type  j  
produces  jx l  units of  1 j   from x  units of j  where  1 j l   and  1 j  .  Utility is only 
for consumption c  of the final good, and is represented by a strictly increasing, strictly 
concave function and smooth function  () uc .  
A  k -production chain  for  1 k    consists of one generalist and specialists 
1, 1 jk   . The generalist produces intermediate good  1 k  . The labor of the chain   4 
must be used exclusively within the chain, and the output of the chain is equally divided 
among chain members. Consequently, the per capita output of the chain is 
1
1 () k
jj fk lb 
   if  1 k  , and  (1) f b  . 
After a chain is formed and specialties chosen, there is a probability 01 p   
that each individual “fails.” Any chain with one or more failed individuals is unable to 
produce any output. We imagine that the producer may be sick, be involved in an 
accident, have a specialized machine that breaks, go bankrupt, or otherwise be 
unavailable. The critical feature of the model is that if a chain has one failure then the 
entire chain cannot produce. 
Critical to the analysis is the correlation of failures across chains. It may be that 
failures are independent across individuals. It may also be that the probability of failure is 
higher if another individual in the same chain fails: that is, shocks may be more likely to 
occur to individuals working in the same chain. Moreover, it may be possible to swap 
individuals between chains. If specialist  j  in one chain fails, it is natural to try to obtain a 
j  specialist from another chain.  
It is tempting here to think in terms of large mass markets forgetting social 
feasibility constraints. That is, if I am a car manufacturer and my tire supplier fails, I just 
go to another supplier to get tires. But in general equilibrium, the other supplier was 
supplying tires to someone – and if I get those tires, some other automobile manufacturer 
does not. However: if another automobile making chain has a piston maker who has 
failed, then the tire manufacturer in that chain is unemployed and happy to provide me 
with tires. Hence when there are failures, some reduction in output must be accepted, but 
it is best to try to concentrate the failures all in the same chain. A simple example with 
three chains of length three and three failures makes the point.  
   Suppose there are three chains producing cars: Jaguars, BMWs, and Toyotas. 
Each chain has three links: tires, pistons, and unspecialized. Suppose there are three 
failures. Consider three different patterns of failure: labeled good, intermediate and bad. 
   5 
Type of shock  Jaguar  BMW  Toyota 
good  Tires  x     
Pistons  x     
Unspecialized  x     
 
intermediate  Tires  x     
Pistons    x   
Unspecialized      x 
 
bad  Tires  x  x  x 
Pistons       
Unspecialized       
 
In the good case only the Jaguar chain fails. This is the best outcome –  with three 
failures, at most two chains can produce output. In the bad case all the tire producers fail: 
in this case it is impossible to produce any cars. Finally, in the intermediate case one link 
of each type fails. If it is possible to reorganize the chains to move all the failures to one 
chain, then two chains can produce output. Whether this is possible depends on market 
organization, the availability of information, the quality of business connections, and the 
degree of substitutability between specialists. With a high degree of substitutability and 
good market organization, two chains may be able to produce. With poor substitutability 
or poor market organization, none of the chains will be able to produce. 
We can think of the situation in terms of the reliability of a chain  () Rk , that is, 
the probability a chain of length k  succeeds, as well as the per capita output  () y fk   of 
a chain of length k . If shocks are highly correlated, then  () Rk  falls slowly with chain 
length. If shocks are largely independent, then  () Rk   falls rapidly with chain length. 
Expected output is given by  ()() Rkfk . Notice that it is easy to construct models in which 
expected output is maximized as k : if, for example, if  () fk  much more 
quickly than  () 0 Rk  , or if  () Rk  is bounded away from zero and  () fk is not bounded 
away from infinity. However, such models predict that chains produce very rarely – that 
they have very high failure probabilities – but on those rare occasions when they do 
produce, they produce gigantic amounts. As we do not observe such technologies being   6 
used,
1
There are two simple models that capture a positive correlation of failures. One is 
to assume that there is a positive probability that an individual is in a chain consisting 
entirely of successes. This leads to a model in which the probability of failure is bounded 
away from zero independent of 
 our goal in designing a model will be to choose functional forms for which this is 
not the case. 
k , and as we observed, this leads to the implausible 
prediction that there is rarely any output, but occasionally there are bursts of 
exceptionally large levels of output. In addition, it seems unlikely that intermediate goods 
are perfect substitutes: while final goods, such as Jaguar automobiles and BMW 
automobiles may be good substitutes, the pistons for their engines are not.  
Here we make the opposite assumption: we assume that there is a positive 
probability that an individual is in a chain consisting entirely of failures. Specifically, we 
assume that there is a probability rp    that an individual is in such a chain; with 
probability  1 r    she is in a chain in which each individual has an independent 
(1 )/(1 ) pr   probability of success. The overall probability of failure for an individual 
is then  (1 )(1 (1 )/(1 )) r r p rp    , as desired. The resulting probability a 
chain succeeds is  ( ) (1 )((1 )/(1 ))k Rk r p r    . 
Next, consider the production process. What happens if  j l  is constant? In this 
case as the length of the chain increases the probability of success goes to zero 
exponentially, and the output of the chain increases exponentially. Unless the exponential 
rates are exactly the same, the optimal chain length is either one or infinity. The former 
case is neither interesting nor empirically relevant. The latter case is the one we have just 
argued is also empirically irrelevant.  Hence we seek technologies in which the return to 
specialization is less than exponential. It is convenient to work directly with the function 










To state our assumption on  () fk, notice that the reliability function 
( ) (1 )((1 )/(1 ))k Rk r p r     is strictly increasing in k  and for  1 Rr  can be 
inverted as  
                                                 
1 Invention of pharmaceuticals and movies would seem to come the closest.   7 
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. 
Although in principle R is restricted to the grid induced by discrete values of k  it will 
often be convenient to treat it as a continuous variable, which we will do without further 
comment. 
Our basic assumption is 
Assumption 1:  () FR is continuous, strictly concave and  (0) 0 F  . 
  To better understand assumption 1, consider the family of technologies 
() ( ) fk b ka   where  0 a  ,  0 b   and    1 b a b  . Notice that is an increasing 
function and that a measures the return to specialization. In addition it is apparent that 
() FR is continuous and  (0) 0 F  . We also have 
Lemma 2:  () FR is strictly concave if and only if either  1 a   or 
 
1







Remark 1: In the case  1 a   we have  () fk concave, which we refer to as diminishing 
returns to specialization. When there are increasing returns to specialization, the gains to 
increasing the length of small chains may be so great that  () FR fails to be concave. 
However, this is not the case if we choose b  sufficiently large.   
Proof: Define  log(1 ) log(1 ) 0 rp l    . We may compute the second derivative 
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Since the second factor is increasing in R,  () FR will be strictly concave if and only if 
() RR FR  is non-negative at the upper bound  1 Rr , that is to say 






   8 
Remark 2: Note that  1 Rp  corresponds to a 1-chain  1 k  . Since  (0) 0 F   and  
(1 ) 0 Fp  there is some R such that for all smaller R we have  ( ) (1 ) FR F p  , 
that is, a 1-chain yields higher expected output – as well as greater reliability – than any 
chain of length greater than  () kR. 
We can characterize the concavity of  () FR by a bound on the derivatives of the 
primitive  () fk with a Lemma proven in the Appendix. 
Lemma 2:  () FR is strictly concave if and only if  
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  . 
In particular it is sufficient that  () fk be concave. 
  For some results we will also need to insure that  () fk not be too concave.  
Definition 3: We say that  () fk is moderately concave if 







   
This is satisfied for the class  () ( ) fk b ka   with  0, 0 b a  , in which case 
  11 () / () ( () /() ) ( ) ( () /() ) kk k k k f k fk fk f k b k fk f k k        . 
3. An Example 
We start by studying the relationship between expected output and the length of a 
chain k  in the simple case  () fk k a  . In this case expected output is 
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As indicated, we will allow R to be a continuous variable, so we can maximize 
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The sign of the derivative is determined by the term in square brackets, which is 
decreasing in R. This implies that  () FR is single peaked
2 1 a   even for   and has a 
maximum that is determined by a unique solution to the first order condition 
  ˆ (1 ) R re a   . 
From this the optimal chain length is 
  ˆ







This simple formula shows how the optimal degree of specialization is 
determined by the trade off between the increased output of longer chains, and the 
increased failure rate. A greater return to chain length as measured by a means longer 
chains; higher probability of failure as measured by p means shorter chains; and higher 
correlation of shocks as measured by r  means longer chains. Notice also that the optimal 
reliability rate  ˆ R is independent of the failure rate p. It is decreasing in both a and r , 
so that as correlation increases, chain length increases so much that unemployment goes 
up.  
  We may summarize this as 
Proposition 4:  Greater returns to specialization a, lower failure probability p, or 
higher correlation of shocks r  and expected output maximization imply higher expected 
output  Y , more specialization k   and no less unemployment U . Greater returns to 
specialization and higher correlation of shocks strictly increase unemployment U , which 
is independent of the failure probability. Optimal chain length is 
  ˆ







and optimal unemployment is   ˆ 1 (1 ) U re a   . 
4. An Economy of Chains 
  We now consider a continuum economy. The shocks to chains and individuals are 
taken to be independent, which we interpret as meaning that a certain fraction of chains 
                                                 
2 If k  is restricted to the natural numbers, this means that the expected output maximizing choice of chain 
length must be at one of the grid points adjoining the point  ˆ k  that maximizes expected output over the 
positive real numbers   10 
and individuals fail. That is, we assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty caused by 
the failure of individuals or chains. We index the production function by a, so that 
(, ) y fka  . 
  The sole friction in the economy is an insurance market imperfection. Following 
Kehoe and Levine [1993], we assume that only a fraction g  of output can be used to 
make insurance payments. If  1 g    we are in a frictionless full insurance world. If 
0 g   no insurance is possible. The economy has several stages: 
 
  Complete contingent insurance markets 
  Determination of chain length. 
  Realization of an aggregate shock (,,,) pr S ag  , where S  is a finite set. 
  Realization of individual shocks 
  Output produced and insurance claims paid 
 
This is a public information economy and our notion of equilibrium will be that of 
constrained efficiency –  that is maximization of the welfare of the ex ante identical 
individuals in this economy. Note, however, that this is equivalent to a competitive 
equilibrium – that is, the first and second welfare theorems hold in this economy. To see 
this, observe that there are only finitely many relevant production technologies k : as we 
observed production technologies for which  (,,,) max ( ( , , )) pr S k kR pr ag a     are 
dominated by 1-chains. Second, observe that the insurance market friction may be 
equivalently modeled by a physical production technology. That is, we may imagine that 
the input x  jointly produces two kinds of output:  () fkx g  units of tradable output, and 
(1 ) ( ) fkx g   of untradable output. This economy is completely a classical continuum 
general equilibrium economy, and so satisfies the welfare theorems – the second welfare 
theorem being trivial, as everyone is ex ante identical. Notice, however, that it may be 
efficient to put fractions of the population in different length chains; implicitly we are 
assuming that individual can be allocated to chains by means of lotteries, and that these 
lotteries are traded or that sunspot contingencies are available as in Kehoe, Levine and 
Prescott [2002].   11 
5. No Aggregate Shock 
  We consider the case of an economy with no aggregate shock, so just a single 
aggregate state. We first show that it is not optimal to use lotteries or sunspot contingent 
chain lengths –  there is an optimal chain length. Second, we examine when the 
comparative statics of output maximizing chain length in Proposition 1 extend to the 
general case. Throughout we assume that the length of chains are not restricted to integer 
values. 
  As remarked above we can have an economy consisting of chains of many 
different lengths, with individuals assigned to chains by lottery. Specifically, we can have 
a probability measure m  over a space , with a measurable function  () k w  describing the 
corresponding length of chain. We may equally well describe the lottery by a measurable 
function  () R w  rather than  () k w .  
If a chain at w  is successful it produces  (() ) /() FR R ww . It consumes what is left 
over after all seizable output is seized plus an insurance payment  1() z w , receiving in total 
  1() ( 1 )(() ) /() z FR R w gww  . If it is unsuccessful, it consumes just an insurance 
payment  0() z w . Feasibility for insurance payments requires that  10 () , () 0 zz ww   and 
that the aggregate amount of insurance payments can be no greater than the seizable 
fraction of expected output 
    10 ()() ( 1 () )() ( ) (() )( ) R z R z d FR d w w w wmw g wmw    . 
Proposition 5: The optimal lottery m  is degenerate and places weight one on a single 
value of k . 
The proofs of the Propositions in this section can be found in the Appendix. 
The utility function  () uc  induces preferences over expected output and reliability. 
We can round-out our picture of the economy be describing these preferences. Let Y  be 
the expected per capita output of the common optimal chain. If the largest possible 
transfer is made from the successful to unsuccessful chains, then a successful chain gets 
(1 ) / YR g  , and a failed chain gets    / /(1 ) /(1 ) YRR R Y R gg   . If it is 
feasible for the failed chain to get more output than a successful chain 
(1 )(1 ) RR gg   then it is optimal to provide full insurance. Equivalently, we may   12 
write this as  1 R g . For these values of R only specialized output matters, and 
indifference curves are horizontal. 
  We now consider what happens when there is only partial insurance  1 R g . 
The welfare function – expected utility – is  
      ( , ) (1 ) / (1 ) /(1 ) W RY Ru Y R R u Y R gg     . 
We observe that  ((1 ) / ) Ru Y R g    is homogeneous of degree one, and since u   is 
concave it is also concave. The same is true of (1 ) ( /(1 )) Ru Y R g  . As W  is the sum 
of these two functions, it is also concave. 
Proposition 6: The welfare function is concave in  , RY and strictly increasing in Y . 
Indifference curves are for  1 R g   smooth and downward sloping, and for 
1 R g  horizontal. Indifference curves are differentiable including at  1 R g . 
Comparative Statics 
  In order to do comparative statics, we will need more assumptions about 
functional form. For the given utility function  () uc   we may define as usual the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion  () c r .  
Definition 7: We say that risk aversion is moderate if (() /) [ 1 () ] ' () 0 cc c c r rr   . 
In the CRRA aversion case, this is true if and only if  1 r  , that is, there is no more risk 
aversion than exhibited by the logarithm. In this case the utility function is  1 c r   and 
which we describe as a moderate CRRA. 
  Under moderate risk aversion we can establish the effect of better insurance 
Proposition 8: With moderate risk aversion, if there is partial insurance then increasing 
g   lowers reliability R, raises unemployment  1 UR   and increases welfare, 
specialization and chain length k . 
What determines financial sector efficiency g ? This is a static model –  to 
properly study insurance requires a dynamic setting since savings, portfolio balancing 
and borrowing along with bankruptcy and traditional unemployment insurance all form 
part of the overall insurance against unemployment. We can identify improved g  broadly 
with an improved financial sector. As we would expect, a better financial sector raises 
welfare. It does so by encouraging investment in riskier projects –  that is to say, it   13 
encourages greater specialization by spreading the risk of failure. The striking fact is that 
by doing so it also raises the risk of failure: we should expect to find higher 
unemployment associated with better financial markets. 
 Bankruptcy may perhaps be overlooked as a form of insurance in this context – 
but one of the major causes of bankruptcy is job loss, and the ability to repudiate debt is 
an important form of insurance. You may recall that before the current crisis bankruptcy 
laws in the U.S. were tightened making it harder to go bankrupt. This lowers g  by 
making it more difficult to transfer resources from the employed – the lenders – to the 
unemployed, and of course lowers welfare. Why would anyone lobby for the government 
to take actions that lower g ? The thing to bear in mind is that when the law was changed 
there was already a great deal of outstanding debt that was made more difficult to 
discharge. Hence there was a one-time transfer from borrowers who might like to default 
to lenders. Clearly the credit companies – the lenders – took the view that their short-term 
gain more than offset the long-term loss caused by the fact that less debt – and insurance 
– would be acquired in the future. Hence the pursuit of a one-time transfer payment led to 
a decreased efficiency of the economy. 
  As our last result on the economy without shocks, we extend can extend the 
comparative statics of the example in Proposition 3.   We parametrize the 
production function, considering  (, ) fka .  
Definition 9: We say that a increases returns to specialization if  () 0 yk a   and 
 
( (, ) /(, ) )





This says output increases but that the marginal product of specialization is increased 
more.  
Proposition 10: Suppose that preferences are a moderate CRRA. (i) If a  increases 
returns to specialization then higher a  leads to higher expected output Y   more 
specialization  k   and more unemployment U . (ii) Under moderate concavity of the 
production function a lower failure probability p or a higher correlation of shocks r  
leads to higher expected output Y  more specialization k  and no less unemployment U ; 
higher correlation of shocks leads to strictly more unemployment.   14 
Optimal reliability under full insurance given by the unique solution  ˆ R to  
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If  ˆ 1 R g  there is full insurance. Otherwise there is partial insurance and optimal 
reliability is determined as the unique solution to 
1 1 11 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ( )/ ( ))
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Notice that the optimal reliability is a strictly decreasing function of chain length, so the 
optimal chain length is given by  
 
ˆ log(1 ) log ˆ








and optimal unemployment by  ˆˆ 1 UR . 
  One question is whether there is any empirical sense to the idea that poor 
countries have lower unemployment rates than rich countries. Using data from the CIA 
World Factbook, and eliminating tiny countries such as Monaco, and oil-producing 
countries such as Qatar, the countries with lowest unemployment are 
 
Uzbekistan  1.1% 
Thailand   1.5% 
Cuba   1.7% 
Papua New Guinea   1.8% 
Bermuda   2.1% 
Tajikistan   2.2% 
Laos   2.5% 
Mongolia   2.8% 
 
which are not only poor countries, but include a large number of communist or formerly 
communist countries, a point we will return to. However, the countries with the highest   15 
unemployment are also very poor: Zimbabwe with 95% unemployment and Liberia with 
85% unemployment being the extreme cases. However, in those cases unemployment 
seems to have less to do with specialization than with the absence of functioning political 
systems – which is to say, real unemployment and economic success is not explained 
only by long production chains, but the absence of civil wars and other civil disruptions 
also play a crucial role. 
7. A Low Probability Negative Shock 
  We now turn to the impact of a shock. We examine the simplest case of a single 
negative shock. The crucial fact is that the shock hits after chain length has been 
determined. Our main goal is to establish how longer chains and lower correlation 
function as multipliers increasing the impact of a particular shock. 
We will parametrize the production function, taking a  as a parameter that 
increases output y . We consider the situation where there is a low probability of a 
negative shock.  Specifically, we suppose that there is a baseline shock  0 00 0 ( ,1 , , ) pr ag   
with probability 1 p    and a negative shock  0 00 0 ( ,1 , , ) ( ,1 , , ) pr p r a ga g     with 
probability p. We suppose that the probability of the negative shock is sufficiently small 
that the optimal chain length  ˆ k  is approximately what it would be when  0 p  .  
  Fixing the chain length k  what is the impact of a negative shock on welfare, 
aggregate output, total factor productivity (TFP) and unemployment? 
Production Function Shocks 
A reduction in the benefits of the specialization technology a lowers welfare and 
aggregate output and has no effect on unemployment. Since the same amount of 
employment produces less aggregate output, TFP falls. Since the condition for full 
insurance is  1 R g  and R is not changed, with a fixed chain length k  and a change 
only in a, the financial constraint will be binding if and only if it was binding in the base 
state. Notice that the impact of a on aggregate output is fa. This is increasing in k  if 
0 k f a  ; in particular this is the case if a increases the returns to specialization. 
Failure Rate Shocks 
An increase in the failure rate p lowers welfare, lowers aggregate output and 
either raises unemployment or leaves it unchanged. It has no effect on TFP since the   16 
output per employed worker does not change. Since R declines, a financial constraint 
that does not bind in the base state may bind in the bad state further lowering welfare. 
Recall that reliability is given by 











from which we may find the quantitative impact of a shock to p 













The longer is the chain k   and the higher is the correlation r   the more sensitive is 
reliability and unemployment to changes in p. This is a kind of “reverse Keynesian 
multiplier” where the impact of a shock is greatly increased by the fragility of the chains 
that make up the economy. Notice that there is kind of a double-impact of the base level 
of correlation. If base correlation is high then this implies that the optimal choice of k  is 
large, so that  p R  will be very large indeed. 
Since the production function f  and chain length k  do not change in response to 
a failure rate shock, as we observed, TFP does not change. That is, decreased output is 
due entirely to decreased hours worked. It is less apparent that measured TFP will be 
unchanged. Specifically, in the model everyone working for an unproductive chain is 
counted as “unemployed.” In practice this is neither the definition of unemployment used 
in collecting statistics, nor practically what it measures. That is, one specialized firm in a 
failed chain may close down laying off workers who become “unemployed” while 
another specialized firm in the same or a different failed chain may simply work hard 
while failing to produce any useful output. The economic consequences are the same in 
both cases, yet in one case the firm contributes unemployment and a reduction of hours 
worked, while in the other the firm contributes no unemployment or reduction in hours 
worked.  
Specifically, suppose that unemployment U  in the model translates as a fraction 
of workers who are measured as unemployed  U h  and a fraction who are measured as 
employed but who are in fact unproductive  (1 )U h  . In this case an increase in the 
underlying variable U  raises unemployment, but it also reduces the hours worked less 
than the reduction in output, that, TFP is output divided by hours worked   17 
 










and so measured TFP falls, although actual TFP does not. This should be a warning 
against paying too much attention to measures such as unemployment or TFP: measured 
employment and hours worked do not distinguish between individuals who play cards at 
home because they have been laid off, and those who play cards at work because their 
production line has been shut down by a shortage of parts. From the overall viewpoint of 
the economy, however, both are equally unproductive.  
Correlation Shocks 
A decrease in the correlation r  lowers welfare, lowers aggregate output and raises 
unemployment. Like a shock to the failure rate, it has no effect on TFP although it may 
reduce measured TFP. Since R declines, a financial constraint that does not bind in the 
base state may bind in the bad state further lowering welfare. The quantitative impact of a 
shock to r  is 
   
2 1










which exhibits the same kind of sensitivity to long chains and a high underlying 
correlation rate as does shocks to the failure rate. 
  A key issue is the correlation of p and r . That is, when we measure the size of a 
shock, we are likely to measure the change in p. Consider, for example, a shock to a 
resource prices. Suppose we measure the size of shock by the increase in the cost to 
economy of continuing the same level of resource usage as in the base state. This is a 
measure of p: the fraction of the economy that will fail due to these increased costs we 
imagine is roughly proportion to the increase in cost. However, the overall impact of the 
shock is measured by the number of chains that fail, not the number of individuals that 
fail, and this depends on the correlation. Different shocks of the same size p may have 
different correlations r . For example, crude oil shocks may have a very low r  because 
the failures they cause are spread across chains, while linseed oil shocks may have a very 
high r  because they fall primarily in a single chain, and there are easy substitutes. Hence 
a shock to the price of crude oil and a shock to the price of linseed oil that have the same   18 
overall economic cost as measured by change in price times sales will have very different 
economic consequences. 
Dynamic Shocks 
Next, consider the temporal dimension of the shock. The shock here is assumed to 
take place after chain length is determined. When we studied the comparative statics of 
chains without a shock, implicitly we were examining what happens to chain length that 
is determined after a shock. To make this formal, consider three periods. There are no 
temporal connections between the periods – no savings or investment. However we allow 
for a correlation structure in the shocks. In particular, if last period was the base state, the 
probability of the bad state in the current period is small: p. However, if last period was 
the bad state, then in the current period the probability of the base state is also p. That is, 
we assume a high degree of serial correlation in the states. The initial condition is the 
base shock. 
Consider a shock to either p or r  or both. In the first base period output and TFP 
are high and unemployment is low. In the second period unexpectedly a shock hits. This 
lowers output and possibly TFP and raises unemployment.  In the third period it is now 
very likely that the negative state will remain. This implies a lower optimal chain length, 
further lowering output and definitely lowering TFP. However: it also lowers 
unemployment – below even what it was in the base state as we know from Proposition 
10. In other words, output and TFP fall continually, while unemployment spikes up then 
drops back down. 
Financial Shocks 
A reduction in the efficiency of the financial sector g  can lower welfare, but has 
no effect on measurable variables such as aggregate output, TFP or unemployment. In 
order to have an impact, the financial constraint must bind in the bad state. Notice that if 
it binds in the good state, it necessarily binds in the bad state. 
An important consideration is whether g   is accurately known. Take the case 
where in the base economy the insurance constraint is not binding –  there is full 
insurance. The value of g   will only matter when the negative shock hits; this is 
infrequent so wrong beliefs will be slow to be corrected. This can be viewed as a kind of   19 
“quasi” self-confirming equilibrium. Self-confirming equilibrium allows wrong beliefs 
about events that are not observed. However, wrong beliefs about events that are rare can 
persist for a  long period of time, so are not that different from events that are not 
observed at all. Moreover, the financial sector –  which profits by selling more 
“insurance” has a strong incentive to exaggerate the efficacy of that insurance – as was in 
fact done in recent years by issuing numerous loan guarantees not backed by any 
resources that could be used to honor the guarantees. Hence the promised g  may be 
larger than the actual g . This will only be discovered after the negative shock hits, at 
which point there will be a “crisis” in the sense of the existence of many promises 
impossible of fulfillment. At which point there will be a fight over who gets 
shortchanged, and Lloyd Blankfein gets on the phone to Hank Paulson and says “It 
shouldn’t be us – grab 800 billion from the Treasury.” 
The key point is: regardless of who winds up bearing the burden of unfulfillable 
promises there will be a strong temptation to say “This should never happen again” and 
tighten up financial regulation – and by doing so reduce the value of g . This of course 
will reduce welfare, and in the future when chain length can adjust, lead to a long-term 
reduction in output and welfare. Japan and the United States seem to have been especially 
proficient at responding to crises by strangling their financial sectors: Both countries have 
allowed large failed banks to pretend to be solvent by holding treasury securities rather 
than lending to the private sector. By way of contrast Chile and Sweden responded to 
crises by explicitly failing their banks, and creating new banks that could carry on a 
normal banking business. 
Short Chains 
Efficient economies with large values of  ,, r ga  and 1 p   will have long chains. 
As we observed, long chains are vulnerable chains, and output and welfare will decline 
more in response to shocks – possibly substantially more. This can of course be avoided. 
For example, the capitalist economy can be replaced by a government planned economy, 
and the government may (and probably will) choose the length of chain k  lower than the 
optimal level  ˆ k . This reduces welfare, but also reduces volatility. It also reduces 
unemployment, both in the base state and following a shock. All of which suggests that 
measures to reduce unemployment should be viewed with a degree of skepticism. If the   20 
model of production chains is correct, then high volatility is the price we must pay for 
high welfare.  
Notice also that choosing short chains while it may reduce unemployment 
following a shock, does not necessarily increase welfare even ex post  following the 
negative shock. Take the case of a chain of length 1. This exhibits the least volatility, but 
also the least aggregate output in any state. If g  is high, there can be full insurance even 
in the bad state: in this case it is better to be unemployed in the bad state at  ˆ k  than to be 
employed in the “socialist paradise”. Indeed, we may well ask: is it better to be employed 
in Cuba or unemployed in the United States? In fact weekly pay in Cuba is about $187,
3 
while unemployment benefits in the United States are about $300.
4
  This analysis suggests a natural experiment. From the end of the Second World 
War until it entered the oil market in a large way in the 1970s, the Soviet bloc was a 
closed and planned economy. Did it have shorter production chains than the West? Did it 
have lower unemployment and less volatility? Can this be accounted for by the different 
length of production chains? The first step in applying this type of theory is to develop 
some effective measure both of the length of chains, and the correlation 
 
r . Unfortunately 
there may not be reliable data on the old Soviet block – economic statistics from that 
period consist mostly of lies, but insofar as reliable data can be found, it seems a good 
place to look. Even the very crude examination of unemployment statistics above shows 
the lowest unemployment rates dominated by communist and former communist 
countries. 
International Trade Considerations 
  We have considered a closed economy. What about trade between countries? Two 
considerations come to mind. First, chains can overlap countries. There may be many 
chains in a large country, only a few of which extend to a smaller country. Shocks that 
impact the sector that overlaps will have a large impact on the small country, but only a 
small impact on the large country: when the United States coughs, Mexico catches cold. 
  The other application is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI has a 
disproportionately beneficial effect on developing countries. These small countries with 
                                                 
3 The CIA World Factbook reports annual per capital income in Cuba of 9700 PPP adjusted 2009 U.S. 
dollars. 
4 U.S. Department of Labor.   21 
poorly developed financial sectors and few ties to outside suppliers will find it optimal to 
choose short production chains. A large multinational can create a chain that lies mostly 
outside the country, and has access and connections to supplier worldwide. Hence it has 
an incentive to create longer and more productive chains. After a time, knowledge of 
outside suppliers and business connections will spread to other producers in the 
developing country – effectively increasing their r  and making it efficient for domestic 
producers to create longer and more productive chains. It is widely understood that the 
spread of knowledge is the likely suspect for the disproportionate effect of FDI. The 
model of production chains suggest a possible mechanism through which this acts. 
8. Conclusion 
At the heart of this paper is the importance of understanding whether fluctuations 
are efficient or not. Are they the price we pay for wealth? If so, far from being a problem, 
they are a solution – and policies to mitigate them can be counterproductive. This can be 
seen by the possibility of creating inefficiently short changes in order to mitigate 
volatility.  
The model of chains also helps understand the consequences of technological 
change. For example, better communications – the internet – can potentially increase r . 
This will lead to greater specialization, longer chains, more output, and higher welfare. 
But it will also result in higher unemployment and greater volatility.  
In short – the capitalist economy may indeed be more prone to crisis – and this 
may be a good thing.   22 
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Appendix 
Define the constant  log(1 ) log(1 ) 0 rp l    . 
Lemma 2:  () FR is strictly concave if and only if  
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Hence,  () 0 RR FR   if and only if  0 k kk ff l  , which is the desired condition. 
 
Proposition 5: The optimal lottery m  is degenerate and places weight one on a single 
value of k . 
Proof: Consider  
  () ()( ) R R Rd w wm w   .  
and the insurance scheme  00 () () zz ww  ,  
  11 1 () ()()( ) / 0 z z Rz d R w w wm w    . 
We will show that this scheme does no worse than the original one, and if the original 
one is non-degenerate, strictly better. 
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so the proposed scheme satisfies the insurance feasibility constraint. Notice that under the 
new scheme, there are exactly as many unemployed as under the old scheme, and that   25 
they get exactly the same insurance payments. The expected payment to an employed 
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where the inequality follows because  () YR is strictly concave, and is strict if the original 
lottery is non-degenerate. Under the old scheme the employed received utility.  
    1 11 () () ( 1 )(() ) /() ( ) / () ( () ) R u z PR R d R uc uz PR w w g w wm w       
where the first inequality is Jensen’s inequality. This shows the new scheme is better. 
 
Proposition 6: The welfare function is concave in  , RY and strictly increasing in Y . 
Indifference curves are for  1 R g   smooth and downward sloping, and for 
1 R g  horizontal. Indifference curves are differentiable including at  1 R g . 
Proof: We already observed in the text that  (, ) W RY  is concave. To do the relevant 













with exact equality if and only if  1 R g . We then compute the partial derivatives of 
the welfare function      ( , ) (1 ) / (1 ) /(1 ) W RY Ru Y R R u Y R gg      
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We observe that  R W  vanishes at the full insurance line  1 R g , and is negative to the 
left since u is concave. 
   26 
Proposition 8: With moderate risk aversion, if there is partial insurance then increasing 
g  lowers reliability R, raises unemployment  1 UR  and increases specialization 
and chain length k . 
Proof: Notice that changes in g  do not change  () FR. In the proof of Proposition 6 we 
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Rearranging we find 
    ( ' '') ' ( / )[1 ] ' D u cu u c r rr      
which is negative from the condition of moderate risk aversion. 
 
Proposition 10: Suppose that preferences are a moderate CRRA. (i) If a  increases 
returns to specialization then higher a  leads to higher expected output Y   more 
specialization  k  and more unemployment U . (ii) Under moderate concavity a lower 
failure probability p or a higher correlation of shocks r  leads to higher expected output 
Y  more specialization k  and no less unemployment U ; higher correlation of shocks 
leads to strictly more unemployment. 
Optimal reliability under full insurance given by the unique solution  ˆ R to  
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If  ˆ 1 R g  there is full insurance. Otherwise there is partial insurance and optimal 
reliability is determined as the unique solution to 
1 1 11 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ( )/ ( ))
0
R R R R R F R FR r r r r r r rr r gr g r g g                    

 
Proof:  In the case of full insurance, expected output must be maximized, and  () FR is 
concave by assumption, so  () 0 R FR . The value of  () R FR  was computed in the proof 
of Lemma 2. Notice that  () /() R F R FR  has the same sign as  () R FR , so to prove 
decreased reliability (or increased unemployment) it suffices to show that  () /() R F R FR 
decreases at  () 0 R FR . 
  Now consider (1 ) 1 re a g     and partial insurance. We may substitute 
() FR into the utility function to find ex ante welfare as a function solely of reliability 
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we then know that the unique optimum has  ˆ () 0 R wR   and that  () 0 RR wR  . So to sign 
changes in  ˆ R, we need only determine whether  ˆ () R wR   increases or decreases: the 
optimal  ˆ R must move in the same direction. Equivalently we may divide through by 
1 () FR r   since this is positive. This gives 
 
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This moves in the same direction as  () /() R F R FR, so as in the case of full insurance, it 
suffices to determine the direction of change of  () /() R F R FR. 
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  The direction of movement of reliability is determined by the direction of 
movement of  () /() R F R FR, and only the second term matters. In the case where a 
increases the returns to specialization, the second term decreases by definition, so 
specialization goes down. This forces a higher specialization rate k , and since the 
production possibility frontier shifted up, higher expected output. 
Next observe that the direction of movement of  () /() R F R FR is the same as that 
of 
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Increasing  p changes only l and makes it larger. Differentiating with respect to l we 
get 
  11 1 // kk k k L kf f kf f l ll l      
which is non-negative by the assumption of moderate concavity of  () fk, so reliability 
goes up. This is possible with higher p only if specialization decreases. Also since the 
production possibility frontier moved down, higher reliability also implies less expected 
output. 
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This has the same sign as    29 
  1 ( 1) / / kk k k k f f fy      . 
Moderate concavity says   1 0 // kk k k k f f ff    , and since  11 ( 1) kk   ,  
we conclude that  r L  is negative. Hence reliability falls, this requires more specialization  
and also, since the production possibility frontier shifted up, expected output goes up. 
 